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Abstract
Part I of this Article examines the chronology of the decade-long conflict in Sierra Leone. It
provides an illuminating backdrop against which the Special Court may be assessed and highlights
particular features that the institutional design of the Special Court would have to accommodate.
Part II explores the precedents for the Special Court. Specifically, it considers the establishment
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (”ICTY”) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (”ICTR”), and the impetus behind the International Criminal Court,
developments that parallel in time the unfolding of Sierra Leone’s conflict. Part III subjects par-
ticular features of the Special Court to critical assessment, namely its institutional design, the lack
of power and resources committed thereto, and the context in which it will operate. It argues that
these features represent fundamental flaws and significant hurdles that need to be overcome if the
Special Court is to operate effectively or efficiently.
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INTRODUCTION
Much of the recent commentary on the conflict in Sierra
Leone has included reference to Robert Kaplan's essay, The Com-
ing Anarchy.' Kaplan writes that "[t]yranny is nothing new in Si-
erra Leone or in the rest of West Africa. But it is now part and
parcel of an increasing lawlessness that is far more significant
than any coup, rebel incursion or episodic experiment in democ-
racy."2 His bleak portrayal of unending chaos suggests there is
very little the world can do but look on. This is exactly what
many have accused the United Nations ("U.N.") of doing. While
NATO planes dropped bombs in Serbia and Kosovo, albeit with-
out explicit U.N. sanction, Sierra Leone seemed a forsaken
place.3
The U.N. did, belatedly, respond to the conflict in Sierra
Leone. By no means its only response, but among the most cen-
tral, is the proposed Special Court for Sierra Leone ("the Special
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1. ROBERT KAPLAN, THE COMING ANARCHY: SHATTERING THE DREAMS OF THE POST
COLD WAR (2000). See David Pratt, Sierra Leone: The Forgotten Crisis (Apr. 23, 1999),
available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/pratt042399.html. This report was prepared
by a member of the Canadian Parliament and Special Envoy to Sierra Leone for the
Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs. See also Steve Coil, The Other War: The Gratuitous
Cruelties Against Civilians in Sierra Leone Last Year Rivaled Those Committed in Kosovo at the
Same Time, WASH. POST MAG., Jan. 9, 2000, at W8, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/photo/galleries/sierra leone; Karen Gallagher, Note,
No Justice, No Peace: The Legalities and Realities of Amnesty in Sierra Leone, 23 T. JEFFERSON
L. REv. 149 (2000).
2. KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 4.
3. This Article will not, however, address the disparity in treatment of the two con-
flicts.
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Court"), which will try those who bear the greatest responsibility
for the conflict's atrocities. Tribunal-establishment as a response
to conflict attracts skepticism, a viewpoint articulated by Kaplan
in another of his essays, when he writes: "[i]nstitutionalizing
war-crimes tribunals will have as much effect on future war
crimes as Geneva Conventions have had on the Iraqi and Ser-
bian militaries."4 We have some appreciation for this view, but it
does not take us very far as it is incapable of being empirically
demonstrated or rejected.5 Moreover, criminal tribunals as a re-
sponse to mass atrocities can, inter alia, bring a measure of jus-
tice and recognition for the victims through the imposition of
penal sanctions on wrongdoers and thus do not rely solely on
deterrence for their justification. We therefore proceed on the
assumption that criminal tribunals are a legitimate response to
conflict, albeit not the only response that can or should be em-
ployed. Our question is, instead, whether the Special Court rep-
resents a legitimate response to the conflict in Sierra Leone at a
broadly political level and whether it is being established with a
sufficiently solid foundation to enable it to operate effectively.
Part I of this Article examines the chronology of the decade-
long conflict in Sierra Leone. It provides an illuminating back-
drop against which the Special Court may be assessed and high-
lights particular features that the institutional design of the Spe-
cial Court would have to accommodate. Part II explores the
precedents for the Special Court. Specifically, it considers the
establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), and the impetus behind the Inter-
national Criminal Court, developments that parallel in time the
unfolding of Sierra Leone's conflict. Part III subjects particular
4. See KAPLAN, supra note 1, at 100.
5. See Developments in the Law-International Criminal Law: II. The Promises of Interna-
tional Prosecution, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1957, 1963 (2001). Payam Akhavan disagrees, writ-
ing that: "Although still in the early stages of their institutional life, the International
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and for Rwanda ("ICTR") pro-
vide a unique empirical basis for evaluating the impact of international criminal justice
on post-conflict peace building." Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Pre-
vent Future Atrocities?, 95 Am. J. INT'L. L. 7 (2001). However, he does acknowledge that
"measuring the capacity of punishment to prevent criminal conduct is an elusive under-
taking, especially when a society is gripped by widespread habitual violence and an
inverted morality has elevated otherwise 'deviant' crimes to the highest expression of
group loyalty." Id.
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features of the Special Court to critical assessment, namely its
institutional design, the lack of power and resources committed
thereto, and the context in which it will operate. It argues that
these features represent fundamental flaws and significant hur-
dles that need to be overcome if the Special Court is to operate
effectively or efficiently.
I. CHRONOLOGY OF THE CONFLICT
In a decade in which atrocities had become almost com-
monplace, Sierra Leone's conflict was still shocking. Horror reg-
istered at the signature amputations, the thousands of children
press-ganged into the service of the respective armed factions,
and the fact that they at times seemed the cruelest of combat-
ants. Here however, the brutality appeared not intended to
achieve any particular political end; the Revolutionary United
Front ("RUF"), the government's armed opposition that
emerged in 1991, lacked a coherent ideology. Instead, it ap-
peared to the outside world a rag tag band of anarchists bent on
destruction. It confirmed the very worst predictions for Africa:
an Africa marked by "the withering away of central governments,
the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread of
disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war."6
However, if the RUF's terror defied easy categorization, it
was not because it lacked reason but because of the enormity in
scope and complexity of the problems to which it responded.
Sierra Leone has, for several years, ranked last in the United Na-
tions Development Program's Human Development Index,7 a
position not won merely by the staging of a decade long civil
war. Sierra Leone's misery is centuries older. Years of colonial-
ism were replaced by independence in 1961 by an almost unin-
terrupted succession of despotic leaders who secured their place
by military coup, and the establishment of a one-party system and
widespread patronage, allowing for unrelenting personal enrich-
ment on the part of the ruling elite.8 Sierra Leone's vast mineral
wealth, particularly its diamonds, has been plundered by its ad-
6. Kaplan, supra note 1, at 9.
7. See U.N. DEVEL. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
INDEX 1999, available at http://www.undp.org/hdro/HDI.html.
8. James Traub, The Worst Place on Earth, N.Y. REV. OF BooKs, June 29, 2000, availa-
ble at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/43.
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ministrators, both pre- and post-independence, institutionalizing
a culture whereby political power is almost interchangeable with
control of the diamond mines. These mines, although not yield-
ing the quality or quantity they once did, continue to provide
,Sierra Leone's greatest economic resource.9
The Sierra Leone people throughout have suffered excruci-
ating levels of poverty. It was therefore no surprise that when
opposition came, it aimed to wrest control of the diamond trade
from the government. The stage was set for its appearance in
the easing of political controls initiated in the late eighties by
President Joseph Momoh, former head of the army. A commis-
sion established to review the then enforced one-party constitu-
tion, ultimately recommended the revival of a multi-party system
of governance.10
At the same time, the Green Book-Muammar Qaddafi's
blueprint for Libyan revolution-was made widely available in
West Africa, including Sierra Leone, and appeared to give at
least a veneer of ideological content to the agendas of those op-
posed to the government. However, Qaddafi's influence in the
region was based far more on the actual support and encourage-
ment he offered certain disaffected elements than on any com-
pelling ideology. He backed Charles Taylor and his National Pa-
triotic Front as they overran Liberia and executed President Sa-
muel Doe. Taylor, in turn, assisted in the overthrow of Burkina
Faso's president, Thomas Sankara, by Blaise Compaore."
Thus, when the RUF emerged in the early 1990's it was
buoyed both by local discontent and regional instability. It en-
tered Sierra Leone from Liberia in 1991 and easily took control
of the eastern region. Although aided by the governments of
Libya and Burkina Faso, it was Charles Taylor of Liberia who
came to be their chief ally, offering troops and a safe haven. 12
Taylor's campaigns of terror also provided a model on which the
RUF based its own strategy. Their practice of abducting chil-
dren, forcing boys to fight and girls to perform sexual service,
and the amputation of limbs distinguished their campaign as
particularly atrocious. 13
9. Id.
10. See Gallagher, supra note 1, at 153.
11. See Traub, supra note 8; see also Pratt, supra note 1.
12. See Traub, supra note 8.
13. It should be noted that the Revolutionary United Front ("RUF") was not alone
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The government initially retaliated by bolstering its armed
forces by recruiting, like the RUF, from among the thousands of
poor, uneducated youth. However, the disaffection was so en-
demic that these forces themselves staged a coup, forcing
Momoh from power. 4 Over the next four years the RUF contin-
ued its fight against successive governments, increasingly gaining
control over lucrative diamond fields. The Economic Commu-
nity of West African States Monitoring Group ("ECOMOG"), led
by Nigeria, entered the fray in 1994 by sending in troops to de-
fend the government.15 By 1995, the rebel assault had not sub-
sided and the government turned to the services of private secur-
ity companies, already deployed in the country, on contract to a
number of mining houses. These private security companies
were remarkably effective, 16 in pushing the rebels back and en-
forcing calm for long enough that multi-party elections could be
held in 1996. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a former U.N. official and
leader of the Sierra Leone People's Party, was elected president
and soon after entered into negotiations with the RUF which re-
sulted, in November 1996, in a peace agreement known as the
Abidjan Accord. 7 Kabbah agreed to dispense with the private
security companies and to grant amnesty to the RUF and other
combatants. The RUF, in turn, agreed to an immediate cease-
fire, disarmament, and demobilization."
The U.N. Secretary-General recommended sending a small
peacekeeping operation to assist the implementation of the
Abidjan Accord, but the recommendation was never approved
by the Security Council.' 9 In the absence of any authoritative
force, allegiances, always shaky, quickly blurred. It was said to be
impossible to distinguish the army from the rebels: "the word
'sobel' was coined to describe soldiers who wore the uniform of
in committing these crimes during the course of the war, but it did commit them on a
more systematic, sustained scale than other parties to the conflict.
14. See Gallagher, supra note 1, at 156. Valentine Strasser, a young army officer,
led the coup gaining notoriety as the youngest head of State in the world.
15. See Pratt, supra note 1.
16. According to accounts from local Sierra Leoneans they were also particularly
brutal.
17. Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolu-
tionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL), Nov. 30, 1996 [hereinafter Abidjan
Accord], available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/abidjanaccord.html.
18. Gallagher, supra note 1, at 157.
19. Report of the Secretary-General on Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/1997/80 (1997).
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the government by day and then robbed, raped, and attacked
civilians by night. 2°
In May 1997, Kabbah was deposed by a government army
faction calling itself the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
("AFRC") .21 These soldiers made concrete their alliance with
the RUF by inviting it to share power.22 As the RUF entered
Freetown, mayhem erupted as soldiers and rebels looted with
impunity and residents of the capital went on strike and refused
to cooperate with the new regime. The situation-a country
now poised on the verge of collapse-finally compelled the U.N.
to act. A Security Council Resolution referred to the situation in
Sierra Leone as "a threat to the peace" and called on the military
regime to return power to the democratically elected Kabbah
government. 23 The Resolution did not, however, authorize in-
tervention, but rather imposed sanctions on Sierra Leone and
mandated ECOMOG to enforce the sanctions and other terms
of the Resolution.
In 1998, Kabbah was restored to power when ECOMOG
troops, predominantly Nigerian, drove the rebels from Free-
town. However, the ECOMOG offensive was unable to reverse
the gains made by the RUF outside of the capital. 24 By the end
of 1998, the RUF controlled well over half the country, and in
early 1999 it again launched an attack on Freetown. Commenta-
tors have, in the aftermath, attempted to capture the sheer bru-
tality of these two weeks, calling it "a war that was at that moment
the world's cruelest, as well as its most invisible. '25  While
ECOMOG troops, employing a force of almost equal ferocity, 26
were eventually able to push the RUF back, an estimated 6000
civilians were left dead, thousands more mutilated and limbless.
The RUF's "Operation No Living Thing" also wrought the ab-
duction of an estimated 3,000 children, the rape of thousands of
20. Traub, supra note 8.
21. Gallagher, supra note 1, at 157.
22. Id. The army's opposition to Kabbah is said to have been provoked by his
recourse to private militias, because the army had not been offered scholarships
abroad, and because they were badly paid. See id.; Coll, supra note 1; Traub, supra note
8.
23. S.C. Res 1270, U.N. SCOR, 4054th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270 (1999).
24. See Pratt, supra note 1.
25. Coil, supra note 1.
26. See id. Freetown inhabitants report countless violations committed by
ECOMOG troops. Id.
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women, and the destruction of much of Freetown.2 v
Graphic images broadcast worldwide finally alerted the West
to the seriousness of the situation, the inadequacy of the
ECOMOG operation, and the untenable position of the govern-
ment. Although intervening militarily in Kosovo, the United
States and the United Kingdom pushed hard for diplomatic set-
tlement in Sierra Leone. President Clinton sent the Reverend
Jesse Jackson to broker peace, a move sanctioned by the U.N.
21
The resulting Lom6 Accord, 29 signed in July 1999, offered am-
nesty to all combatants and provided for RUF inclusion in a new
coalition government in exchange for RUF disarmament. Signif-
icantly the U.N. Secretary-General's Special Representative
("SGSR") added a reservation to the amnesty provision by inter-
preting the article as not applying to "international crimes of ge-
nocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious
violations of international humanitarian law."3 The Accord es-
tablished a timetable for the formation of a neutral peacekeep-
ing force and requested the assistance of the U.N., now prepared
to send troops."' In October 1999, the Security Council estab-
lished the United Nation's Mission in Sierra Leone ("UNAM-
SIL") 32 to assist in carrying out provisions of the agreement. Six
thousand peacekeeping troops were initially pledged.
From the start, the RUF failed to comply with the terms of
the Lom6 Accord. Few of their soldiers entered the disarma-
ment, demobilization, and reintegration camps; human rights
27. Id.
28. See Traub, supra note 8.
29. Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolu-
tionary United Front of Sierra Leone, July 7, 1999 [hereinafter Lom6 Accord], available
at http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html.
30. Gallagher, supra note 1, at 162. HUM. RTS. WATCH, THE SIERRA LEONE AMNESTY
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (Aug. 3, 1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/cam-
paigns/sierra/int-law2.htm.
31. Gallagher, supra note 1. The U.N. Security Council has traditionally been re-
luctant to intervene to protect one side in a civil war-a violation of its principle of
impartiality. It is far more ready to send troops to ensure compliance with a cease-fire
agreement. However, a U.N. Report released last year subjected this principle of impar-
tiality to criticism, arguing that "where one party to a peace agreement clearly and in-
controvertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the
United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may
amount to complicity with evil." Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,
U.N. Docs. A/55/305 - S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000).
32. See S.C. Res. 1270, supra note 23.
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abuses continued;33 and once U.N. troops arrived, they were
ambushed. In May 2000 several hundred U.N. peacekeepers
were taken hostage, evidencing that the Lom6 Accord existed in
name only. 4 However, UNAMSIL maintained its presence and
bolstered its forces, attempting once again to bring the RUF and
the Government of Sierra Leone to the negotiating table. The
Abaju cease-fire, signed in Nigeria on November 10, 2000, re-
committed the parties to the provisions of Lom6, but it too can-
not be said to have immediately ushered in a period of peace
and stability.3 5
Many civilians trapped in areas controlled by the RUF at-
tempted to escape by fleeing across the border to Guinea. The
RUF responded by launching attacks into Guinea, in pursuit of
the fleeing civilians and, it is alleged, hoping to secure control
over Guinea's valuable bauxite mines.3 6 Liberia, already an ally
of the RUF, and motivated by desire to suppress forces opposed
to the Taylor regime, joined the pursuit." In early 2001, the
U.N. was calling the unfolding melee the world's worst humani-
tarian crisis.3s
Six months later there is much more reason for cautious
optimism about the peace-process.39 Although UNAMSIL has
been considerably weakened by a series of internal disputes and
the withdrawal of a number of contributing States' forces,4 ° it is
relatively numerically strong4-at present the world's largest
33. Admittedly, these were not solely the province of the RUF.
34. Bruce Zagaris, U.N. Security Council Votes to Establish War Crimes 77ibunal for Sierra
Leone, 16 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 10 (2000).
35. See id. paras. 3-4 (noting continued disagreement between UNAMSIL and
RUF, and reports of alleged attacks on RUF controlled villages).
36. War Traps 250,000 Refugees, Uproots Residents of Guinea, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Feb. 16, 2001, at 13A.
37. See Guinea is Target of Rebel Movement: Liberian Leader Said to Aid Insurgents,
WASH. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2001, at A12.
38. See Guinea: U.N. Refugee Office to Resume Aid, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG.,
Feb. 20, 2001, at 173B3.
39. See Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra
Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2001/857, para. 57 (Sept. 7, 2001).
40. See Douglas Farah, U.N. Deployment Woes Jeopardize Sierra Leone Cease-Fire, WASH.
POST, Feb. 19, 2001, at A29 [hereinafter U.N. Deployment]; see also Douglas Farah, A
Separate Peacekeeping: In Sierra Leone, Britain, U.N. Clash over Ultimate Aim, WASH. POST,
Dec. 10, 2000, at A42.
41. See Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra
Leone, supra note 39, para. 18 (stating that as of September 5, 2001 UNAMSIL troop
strength had increased to 16,664).
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peacekeeping mission. Britain also has a strong military pres-
ence in Sierra Leone, where it is primarily involved in training
government troops.4 2 The United States sent troops to Nigeria
where they similarly undertook training, but of ECOMOG
troops.4 3 While these initiatives have created some tension be-
tween UNAMSIL, the United States, and the United Kingdom
respectively," they have bolstered the military presence in the
region and intensified pressure on Sierra Leone combatants to
disarm.45 With disarmament and demobilization centers located
throughout the country and the recent entry of UNAMSIL
forces into the northern region, the U.N. now maintains a pres-
ence throughout Sierra Leone.46
Attempts have also been made to address the structural
causes fuelling the war. In January 2001, a U.N. panel of experts
released a report on the illegal diamond trade in Sierra Leone,
accusing President Taylor and the Liberian government of sup-
porting the RUF's attacks in exchange for diamond conces-
sions.4 7 The attendant condemnation and imposition of travel
bans appear to have forced President Taylor to sever ties with the
RUF.48
A number of suspected RUF leaders are in government cus-
tody, among them Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF, who was
arrested on May 17, 2000. 4 ' The government of Sierra Leone
42. See U.N. Deployment, supra note 40.
43. Daniel Benjamin, The Limits of Peacekeeping: The U.S. Quietly Launches a Program
to Train Troops in West Africa, TIME EUR., Jan. 8, 2000, at 37.
44. Id.
45. See Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra
Leone, supra note 39, paras. 18, 21 (reporting that UNAMSIL troop strength has in-
creased to 16,664 and that by Sept. 3, 2001 a total of 16,097 combatants had been
disarmed: 6,523 from the RUF, 9,399 from the Civil Defense Force, and 175 from the
AFRC/ex-Sierra Leone army).
46. See id. para. 2 (noting that disarmament has been completed in four districts
and that UNAMSIL deployment now covers a considerable part of the country).
47. Security Council Takes Up Report on Diamonds, Arms in Sierra Leone; Expert Panel
Says Council Sanctions Broken with Impunity, U.N. Doc. SC/6997 (2001), available at http:/
/www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001 /sc6997.doc.htm.
48. Douglas Farah, Sierra Leone's Rebel Without a Home: As Sanctions on Liberia Loom,
Once Feared 'Mosquito'is Under Pressure to Leave, WASH. PosT, Jan. 22, 2001, at Al 3. Illegal
mining continues, however, despite the fact that UNAMSIL, the Government of Sierra
Leone, and the RUF have agreed to moratoriums on diamond mining in order to facili-
tate the disarmament process. See Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Na-
tions Mission in Sierra Leone, supra note 39, para. 3.
49. Gallagher, supra note 1, at 167.
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has looked to the international community for assistance in pros-
ecuting those responsible for atrocities committed during the
war, but not without prompting.50 During her visit to Sierra Le-
one, shortly after the conclusion of the Lom6 Accord, U.S. Sec-
retary of State Madeline Albright hinted at the possibility of an
international tribunal for Sierra Leone. 51  A year thereafter,
President Kabbah sent a letter the U.N. Secretary-General re-
questing assistance from the U.N. in establishing a criminal tri-
bunal for Sierra Leone. 2 In August 2000 the Security Council
passed Resolution 1315, 5" reiterating "that the situation in Sierra
Leone continues to constitute a threat to international peace
and security in the region," and mandating the Secretary-Gen-
eral to negotiate an agreement with the government of Sierra
Leone for the establishment of an independent Special Court.
It further requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on
the implementation of the Resolution, including recommenda-
tions on a number of key issues identified in the Resolution.
This report was presented to the Security Council on October 4,
2000. The Agreement between the U.N. and the Government of
Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone and the Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone
were annexed to the report.54
The Security Council's request of the Secretary-General,
while novel, is not without precedent. In the following section
we examine recent developments in the creation of interna-
tional criminal tribunals that have paved the way for the Special
Court for Sierra Leone.
50. See Zagaris, supra note 34.
51. Gallagher, supra note 1, at 194.
52. Jim Wurst Rights: U.N. Creates Court to Try Sierra Leone War Crimes, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Aug. 14, 2001. This was much like the request sent by the Rwandan President
to the U.N. Secretary-General in 1994 requesting a criminal tribunal to try those re-
sponsible for the country's genocide.
53. S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 4186th mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000).
54. Report of the Secretay-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000). The draft Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
annexed to the Secretary-General's report was subsequently revised in February 2001.
Although not yet made available by the U.N., it was released by the Government of
Sierra Leone. Unless otherwise stated, reference in this Article to the Statute of the
Special Court is to the revised draft of February 2001. The Draft Statute of the Special
Court of Sierra Leone is available at http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/in-
dexl.htm.
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II. THE SPECIAL COURT: ITS PRECURSORS AND PEDIGREE
The decade-long civil war in Sierra Leone roughly corre-
sponds to a time period in which unparalleled developments in
international criminal law were taking place. Like the Special
Court, these were spawned by atrocity. If in 1999, Sierra Leone's
conflict could be said to be the world's cruelest, many at the be-
ginning of the decade would have claimed that mantle for Bos-
nia. Two years later that distinction could be said to have fallen
to Rwanda. In relation to both conflicts, the U.N. released re-
ports acknowledging its failure to do all that it could."
The contemporaneous attempts made to address these con-
flicts included the establishment of ad-hoc criminal tribunals for
the respective regions. At the time, there seemed to be no ap-
propriate, legitimate, or functioning venue in which to try indi-
viduals for crimes committed during these conflicts, although
the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, established in the wake of
World War II, had provided prototypes on which the interna-
tional community could build. Moreover, the Genocide Con-
vention's reference to an international penal tribunal signaled
that the international community had every intention of further-
ing this project.56 The advent of the Cold War, however, re-
moved any hope of achieving the necessary consensus. But dur-
ing the post-Cold War political environment in which the con-
flict in Yugoslavia arose-in fact the Cold War's demise could be
said to have precipitated the conflict-the major powers came to
recognize a common interest in punishing individuals who com-
mit gross human rights violations.57 Thus, by Resolution 827,
the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Char-
ter, unanimously adopted the Statute of the ICTY.58
55. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35. The
Fall of Srebrenica, U.N. GAOR, 54th session, U.N. Doc. A/54/549 (1999) (relating to the
Bosnian conflict); Report of the Independent Inquiry Into the Actions of the United Nations
During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (1999) (relating to the
Rwandan conflict).
56. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
G.A. Res. 260(II)A, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, art. 6 (adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on
December 9, 1948).
57. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution
808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P.
SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA 22-35 (1995).
58. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution on Persons Responsi-
20011
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This was the same method used to establish the ICTR, al-
though this time, there was not universal consensus within the
Security Council. 59 While Rwanda had initially requested the
Tribunal, it came to oppose its establishment and voted against
it in the Security Council. 60 There was some dispute about the
legitimacy of the Security Council's invocation of Chapter VII
powers to establish these ad-hoc tribunals. Although little con-
troversy surrounded the identification of both conflicts as
"threats to the peace," necessary to trigger the extraordinary
powers of Chapter VII, some argued that Article 41 authorizing
"measures not involving the use of armed force" to restore inter-
national peace and security could never have been intended to
include the establishment of international criminal tribunals.6'
Nonetheless the establishment of the two ad-hoc tribunals
gave renewed impetus to the project for an international crimi-
nal court. Commitment to this project had been evidenced spo-
radically throughout the U.N.'s lifespan, yet it was only in the
wake of the ad-hoc tribunals' establishment that sufficient politi-
cal will and international support set the stage for the General
Assembly's Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of the
International Criminal Court.62 In July 1998, after six weeks of
intensive debate and negotiations, the Statute for the Interna-
tional Criminal Court was opened for signature at the Rome
Diplomatic Conference. Unlike the ad-hoc tribunals, the Secur-
ity Council will have no hand in its establishment. Instead the
treaty will enter into force once it is ratified by sixty States,63 after
ble for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Terri-
tory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg., Doc.
S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
59. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of Neighboring states, between January 1, 1994 and
December 31, 1994, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR
Statute].
60. MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 57, at 72.
61. See id. at 75-116. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia sent a letter to the Secre-
tary-General submitting that the Security Council was not entitled to establish an inter-
national tribunal as a subsidiary body under Article 29 of the Charter. A similar argu-
ment was made by the defense in Prosecutor v. Dugko Tadice, Case no. IT-94-1-AR72, Deci-
sion on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Oct. 2, 1995).
62. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Historical Survey: 1919-1998, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAw 609-16 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999).
63. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
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which the International Criminal Court ("ICC") will become a
functioning reality.
The establishment of the ad-hoc tribunals and the efforts to
create an ICC reflect an increasingly sensitive international re-
sponse to the treatment of international conflict. The cessation
of hostilities is no longer regarded as, in itself, sufficient. Instead
contemporary international legal scholarship emphasizes the im-
portance of institutionalizing processes of accountability
whereby justice must be seen and served if a conflict-ridden soci-
ety is to move beyond its traumatic past.6 4
The ICC, once established, should relieve further need of
ad-hoc tribunals. Working as intended, the ICC will be able to
prosecute and punish perpetrators as its attention is drawn to
sites of atrocity. But the ICC is not yet in operation and may not,
once it is, exercise jurisdiction in respect of crimes committed
before its Statute took effect.65 In addition, the jurisdiction of
the ICC is limited either to crimes committed on the territory of
States Parties or in cases where the accused is a national of a
State Party, namely a State that has ratified or acceded to the
Rome Statute.6 6 Therefore, at least for some time, ad-hoc tribu-
nals of the type of the ICTY and ICTR will present themselves as
an option for consideration by the international community in
the wake of atrocity. Yet while it is an ad hoc tribunal, the Spe-
cial Court for Sierra Leone is not accurately understood as the
same type as the ICTR and ICTY. It is best conceived as a varia-
tion on a theme and in the following section we explore the
flaws inherent in this particular variation.
III. BREAKING THE PROMISE
The Secretary-General's Report and the Agreement and
Statute set out the particular features of the Special Court for
(1998), art. 126, available at www.un.org/law/icc/index.html. As of November 14,
2001, 46 States have ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
64. The literature is enormous. We cite only by example: Madeline Morris, Sympo-
sium: Justice in Cataclysm: Criminal Trial in the Wake of Mass Violence, 7 DuKEJ. COMP. &
INT'L L. 319 (1997); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Accountability for International Crime and Serious
Violations of Fundamental Human Rights, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 9 (1996).
65. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 63. Article
11 (1) provides: "The Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after
the entry into force of the Statute."
66. Id. art. 12. Under this article, non-State Parties may also accept the jurisdiction
of the ICC in respect of a particular situation. Id.
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Sierra Leone. Many of these are to be implemented for the first
time with respect to Sierra Leone.67 Chief among these innova-
tive characteristics is the mode of establishment: unlike the
ICTY and ICTR, which were established by Resolutions of the
Security Council and thus constitute subsidiary organs of the
U.N., the Special Court is to be established by agreement be-
tween the U.N. and the Government of Sierra Leone. It will
therefore be "a treaty-based sui generis court of mixed jurisdic-
tion and composition,"68 rather than a subsidiary organ of the
U.N.
The more extensive involvement afforded Sierra Leone in
the case of the Special Court-far more than was offered either
the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda in respect of the ad hoc tribu-
nals-heralds a seemingly positive development. As was earlier
discussed, current legal scholarship emphasizes the importance
of ending impunity of perpetrators-securing their prosecution
and punishment-if a fractured society is to move beyond its his-
tory of abuse, rebuild itself, and attempt genuine reconcilia-
tion. 6" This surely is an objective for Sierra Leone.70 The Spe-
cial Court offers a promise of rebuilding Sierra Leone's society
by ending the widespread impunity but also offers a promise of
rebuilding the society in a much more tangible sense by generat-
ing institutional skills and resources crucial to any functioning
democracy, which will live on long after the Special Court com-
pletes its work. In this respect, the U.N. might be said to have
learnt the lessons of Rwanda well.
There, the Rwandese government took the initiative in pro-
posing the establishment of an international tribunal, and par-
ticipated fully in the deliberations on the Statute but ultimately
voted against Security Council Resolution 955, authorizing the
67. Many of these novel features will, however, be replicated in the provisions for
the Special Court proposed for Cambodia. See NinaJorgensen, The New, More Attractive
Face of International Courts, CARBERRA TIMES, Jan. 19, 2001, at A9.
68. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone, supra note 54, para. 9; Konstantinos D. Magliveras, The Special Court for Sierra
Leone: A New Type of Regional Criminal Court for the International Community?, 17 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 2 (2001).
69. See Bassiouni, supra note 62.
70. S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 53 (recognizing that "in the particular circumstances
of Sierra Leone, a credible system of justice and accountability for the very serious
crimes committed there would end impunity and would contribute to the process of
national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace").
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Tribunal's establishment.71 Its dissent was triggered in part by its
demand that the seat of the Tribunal be situated inside Rwanda
to "teach the Rwandese people a lesson, to fight against the im-
punity to which it had become accustomed ... and to promote
national reconciliation. '7 2 A location inside Rwanda was also ad-
vocated on the basis that "establishing the seat of the Tribunal
on Rwandese soil would promote the harmonization of interna-
tional and national jurisprudence. 73 Commentators such as
Neil Kritz have argued that this critique has particular resonance
for Rwandese society where, because "a substantial percentage of
the population cannot benefit from newspaper or television cov-
erage of the trials, the process ofjustice should be accessible and
visible. 74  In addition, Tribunal sittings within the country
would have served as an important model of due process for do-
mestic efforts and more effectively communicated the idea that
"international and domestic trials are complementary parts of an
integrated, wholistic and multifaceted approach to justice.""
These concerns present themselves with equal force in de-
liberations concerning Sierra Leone and international attempts
at securing justice. The Statute for the Special Court reflects ef-
forts to meet these concerns. Indeed the U.N. could be said to
have taken to heart the caveat that if international tribunals are
to be effective "more attention needs to be given to both the
physical accessibility of proceedings and the dissemination of ob-
jective information to the local population."76 In his report, the
Secretary-General both advocates a broad public information
and education campaign as integral to the Special Court's activi-
ties77 and proposes several potential premises for its seat in the
71. Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and
Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 501, 504-05 (1996).
72. Id. at 508 (citing U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453, at 16 (1994)).
73. Id.
74. Neil J. Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability Mechanisms
for Mass Violations of Human Rights, 59 L. & CONT. PROBS. 127, 131 (1996).
75. Id. at 132.
76. Id.
77. Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
supra note 54. "If the role of the Special Court in dealing with impunity and developing
respect for the rule of law in Sierra Leone is to be fully understood and its education
message conveyed to Sierra Leoneans of all ages, a broad public information and edu-
cative campaign will have to be undertaken as an integral part of the Court's activities."
Id. para. 7. It should be noted that as of September 2001, no educational or publicity
campaigns had been undertaken by the U.N. in respect of the Special Court, although
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Sierra Leone capital, Freetown.7"
Some have asked whether the money for the Rwandan Tri-
bunal would have been better spent on the rebuilding and train-
ing of the Rwandan legal system: the genocide in Rwanda left
the judicial system virtually destroyed-approximately ninety-five
percent of the country's lawyers and judges were killed, exiled,
or imprisoned.79 The fighting in Sierra Leone has unsurpris-
ingly compounded the pre-existing problems of poverty and the
consequent corruption within the Sierra Leone legal system,
leaving its judicial institutions in a similar state of collapse. How-
ever, the Special Court-a cooperative endeavor between the
U.N. and Sierra Leone, with special provisions made for Sierra
Leonean judges, prosecutors, and administrative support staff,
applying international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean
law, and benefiting from internationally contributed personnel,
equipment, and resources-appears likely to inject new life into
Sierra Leone's domestic legal system. Knowledge gained, skills
acquired, and personnel empowered may act as catalysts for the
establishment of new institutions, structures, and culture that
will better safeguard the rule of law and will outlive the existence
of the Special Court. Therefore, Sierra Leone's Special Court
appears to represent the "best scenario" in which the interna-
tional community provides "appropriate assistance to enable a
society emerging from mass abuse to deal with the issues of jus-
tice and accountability itself.""" Viewed outside of the parame-
ters of international tribunals, the Special Court initiative might
be said to neatly fall within the currently favored U.N. discourse
of capacity-building, said to denote the process by which individ-
uals, groups, organizations, institutions, and societies increase
their abilities to: 1) perform core functions, solve problems, de-
fine and achieve objectives; and 2) understand and deal with
their development needs in a broad context and in a sustainable
some efforts have been made to promote the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
The only Special Court sensitization efforts carried out have been initiated by No Peace
Without Justice.
78. Id. para. 60. However, all the potential sites were rejected on financial or se-
curity grounds. It should be noted that the Security Council requested that the Secre-
tary-General address the possibility of an alternative host State, should it be necessary to
convene the Special Court outside its seat in Sierra Leone, for security or other compel-
ling reasons. Id. para. 50.
79. Kritz, supra note 74, at 135.
80. Id. at 148.




However, appearances can be deceptive and emphasis on
the Special Court's capacity-building potential is ultimately disin-
genuous. The Special Court's institutional design, the resources
committed thereto, are so flawed and insufficient as to severely
hamper its potential. Moreover, all too often the context in
which it is to operate has been ignored making it even more
unlikely that it will deliver on its promise. The following sections
examine the difficulties created by the institutional design of the
Special Court, the lack of powers and resources with which it is
to be invested (these relate to a decontextualized Special Court),
and finally the challenges thrown up by the context in which the
Special Court must operate. Often these factors do not work in
isolation but serve to exacerbate the effect of the others. None-
theless in a quest for clarity, we have attempted where possible,
to treat these factors as discrete sets within which specific diffi-
culties may be examined.
A. Critiques of a Decontextualized Special Court
In this section, issues relating to the subject-matter, tempo-
ral, and personal jurisdiction of the Special Court are discussed,
before we address the financial mechanisms and absence of
Chapter VII powers afforded the Special Court. These difficul-
ties would present themselves wherever a tribunal of this type
were to operate, effectively crippling its potential. However, they
are made that much worse in Sierra Leone which suffers chronic
underdevelopment.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Special Court
Like the two ad-hoc tribunals, the Special Court's subject-
matter jurisdiction covers crimes under international humanita-
rian law considered to have had the status of customary interna-
tional law at the time the alleged crimes were committed.82 Ac-
cordingly, the Court will avoid challenges to its legality, particu-
81. U.N. Development Programme, Management Development and Governance
Division, Capacity Development: Technical Advisoy Paper 2, at 5-6, at http://
www.magnet.undp.org/cdrb/Techpap2.html.
82. Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
supra note 54, para. 12. These comprise crimes against humanity (art. 2); violations of
article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II (art. 3), and
other serious violations of international humanitarian law (art. 4). Id. para. 21.
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larly the principle of nullum crimen sine lege and the prohibition
on retroactive criminal legislation."3 The Statute does not, how-
ever, incorporate the entirety of customary international human-
itarian law. Instead, the drafters have tailored the Court's sub-
ject matter jurisdiction to accord with their perception of the
conflict and the atrocities committed during this period. For ex-
ample, the Statute omits the crime of genocide from the Special
Court's jurisdiction because there has been no allegation that
victims of atrocities in Sierra Leone were targeted on the basis of
belonging to a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, 4 as
they were in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in
Rwanda. The Statute, although including violations of Article 3
Common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II,
also fails to provide for the more extensive protections of the
Geneva Conventions, specifically the Grave Breaches provi-
sions.8" These more extensive protections avail during periods
of international armed conflict but not during times of non-in-
ternational armed conflict and their omission signals that the
conflict in Sierra Leone has, in effect, been predetermined as
one of a non-international armed character. That predetermi-
nation is shortsighted-both factually, given Liberia and
Burkina Faso's involvement, and theoretically, given the recogni-
tion that distinctions between international and non-interna-
tional conflicts are difficult to make in contemporary conflict sit-
uations which often evidence aspects of both. 6 Additionally,
lesser protections for victims of internal armed conflict are in-
creasingly difficult to justify.8 7 Had the more extensive provi-
83. Id.
84. Protected groups under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, supra note 56.
85. They were included in the ICTY Statute (ICTY Statute, supra note 58); how-
ever, they were omitted from the ICTR Statute (ICTR Statute, supra note 59).
86. Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L. L.
239, 261 (2000).
87. The ICTY appeals chamber has held:
Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture or the
wanton destruction of hospitals, churches, museums or private property, as
well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary suffering when two sovereign
States are engaged in war, and yet refrain from enacting the same bans or
providing the same protection when armed violence has erupted 'only' within
the territory of a sovereign State? If international law, while of course duly
safeguarding the legitimate interests of States, must gradually turn to the pro-
tection of human beings, it is only natural that the aforementioned dichotomy
should gradually lose its weight.
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sions been included, the judges of the Special Court could then
have made characterizations of the conflict according to the
facts of individual cases.8"
If the Statute is notable for what it omits under subject-mat-
ter jurisdiction, it is perhaps more extraordinary for what it in-
cludes: provisions of Sierra Leone domestic law. Article 5 of the
Statute enables the Special Court to prosecute persons for of-
fences "relating to the abuse of girls under the prevention of
Cruelty to Children Act, 1926," and offences "relating to the
wanton destruction of property under the Malicious Damage
Act, 1861." The Secretary-General justified the decision to cre-
ate a Special Court of mixed jurisdiction on the basis that certain
crimes or aspects of crimes committed during the conflict were
better regulated by Sierra Leonean law than by international
law.8 9 This is not necessarily so: both the abuse of girls and ma-
licious damage to property arguably fall within the ambit of in-
ternational crimes included in the Statute.90 It might be argued
that the crimes under Sierra Leone law offer greater protection
to a greater number of people, since they neither require proof
of the existence of an armed conflict nor a widespread or system-
atic attack.91 However, the elements of these crimes raise signifi-
cant evidentiary difficulties92 and present the specter of a com-
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case no. IT-94-1-A72, Appeal on Jurisdiction, para. 97 (Oct. 2,
1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996).
88. No PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE, So, WHAT IS THE SPECIAL COURT AND WHAT DOES
IT INTEND To ACHIEVE IN THE END? REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL COURT TRAINING SEMI-
NARS 11 (2001).
89. Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court in Sierra Leone,
supra note 54, para. 19.
90. Article 2, inscribing crimes against humanity, prohibits "rape, sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence." It also
prohibits "persecution on political, racial, ethnic or religious grounds" and "other inhu-
mane acts." Article 3, inscribing violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conven-
tions and of Additional Protocol II, prohibits "acts of terrorism" and "outrages upon
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced
prostitution and any form of indecent assault."
91. However, the prosecutorial prescription that only "persons who bear the great-
est responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Le-
onean law" stand trial before the Special Court, makes it extremely unlikely that per-
sons accused only of isolated crimes-acts which do not form part of a widespread and
systematic attack-will be prosecuted before the Special Court.
92. For example, the abuse of girls provisions would require proof of the child's
age, be it 13 or 14. In a country where births are more often not registered or recorded
than they are, this requirement of proof of age could pose problems that are difficult, if
not impossible, to overcome.
2001] 409
410 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 25:391
plex dual start-date for the Special Court-an issue addressed in
detail in a later section. There is the further practical problem
that prosecution of crimes under article 5 would demand reli-
ance on Sierra Leone jurisprudence, which is largely unavaila-
ble. To ensure consistency in application of these laws, judges
on the Special Court would need to have reference to court deci-
sions issued by Sierra Leone domestic courts, but publication of
Sierra Leone court decisions ceased in the 1970s.93 Taking all of
this into account, it appears that any additional protection of-
fered under domestic law is more than offset by the problems it
raises.
2. Temporal Jurisdiction
As hostilities had not ceased at the time of the Statute's first
drafting, the temporal jurisdiction of the Special Court was left
open-ended and in this manner resembles the ICTY which also
has open-ended temporal jurisdiction because it too continued
to be plagued by conflict at the time of its creation. 4 Yet while
the Statute makes provisions for future conflict, it does not ac-
commodate all the conflict that has gone before. In its current
formulation, the Statute dates the beginning of the Special
Court's temporal jurisdiction from November 30, 1996, the con-
clusion of the first comprehensive peace agreement between the
Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF, known as the Abidjan
Peace Agreement.95 The temporal jurisdiction does not, there-
93. Verified by our discussions with legal practitioners in Sierra Leone. Since the
1970s, court decisions are only written in longhand by the judges who decide the cases
and are stored in loose piles in the basement of the courthouse. Many of these deci-
sions were destroyed by fire and thus lost completely during the attacks on Freetown.
94. Article 1 of the Statute of the ICTY provides that the Tribunal "shall have the
power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humani-
tarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance
with the provisions of the present Statute." ICTY Statute, supra note 58. Article I of the
Statute of the ICTR provides jurisdiction in respect of "serious violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens
responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, be-
tween January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994 . . ." ICTR Statute, supra note 59. A
finite period ofjurisdiction was afforded on the basis that hostilities between the Tutsis
and Hutus had come to a halt. There have, however, been subsequent outbreaks of
hostilities between the groups and the Statute would have been better conceptualized
had the drafters understood this possibility and provided for a more expansive jurisdic-
tion.
95. Abidjan Accord, supra note 17; Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment
of a Special Court in Sierra Leone, supra note 54, paras. 26-27.
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fore, encompass the decade-long conflict in its entirety but only
the past five years.
The restricted jurisdiction was triggered by considerations
that the prosecutor should not be overburdened nor the Court
overloaded. It was also intended that the start date of the Spe-
cial Court's jurisdiction not be politically tendentious and that it
encompass the most serious crimes committed by persons of all
political and military groups in all geographical areas of the
country. 6 The November 1996 start-date is said in the Secretary-
General's Report to meet these concerns."
However, on August 20, 2001 the Government of Sierra Le-
one sent a letter to the Legal Counsel of the U.N. in which it
requested that the temporal jurisdiction of the Court be ex-
tended to cover the period since March 1991, when the conflict
first started.9" Reformulation of the Statute's temporal jurisdic-
tion, in keeping with the request, would allow for the creation of
a much more credible Special Court.99 Not only would it allow
the Prosecutor to focus more effectively on "those who bear the
greatest responsibility" for violations committed throughout the
conflict, rather than only those violations which have occurred
during the last five years, it will also facilitate greater public sup-
port for the Special Court. The perception in Sierra Leone is
that the current draft unjustly favors Freetown over the prov-
inces, as the November 1996 date corresponds to the time when
96. Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court in Sierra Leone,
supra note 54, paras. 21-22.
97. Id. paras. 26-27. Two other dates were in contention. May 25, 1997, the date
of the coup d'etat staged by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council against Kabbah's
democratically elected government, and believed to have ushered in more serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law, was rejected on the ground that it would imply
that punishment was sought for participation in the coup. The alternate date, Jan. 6,
1999, marking the launch of the RUF's most recent attempt to capture Freetown and
the peak of the campaign of systematic and widespread crimes against the civilian popu-
lation, was also rejected as it would exclude all crimes committed before that period in
the rural and provincial areas. Id. paa. 27.
98. Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone,
supra note 39, para. 48.
99. Freetown newspapers, for example, have consistently attacked the issue on nu-
merous occasions. In addition, it was criticized in every one of the 21 Special Court
Training Seminars conducted by No Peace Without Justice, which were held in Free-
town, Bo, Kenema, and Mile 91. These seminars attracted a total of 602 participants,
including civil society and human rights organizations, lawyers, Paramount Chiefs, po-
lice, teachers, combatants, and ex-combatants: not a single voice was raised in support
of retaining the start-date at 1996.
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the capital first became a target of attack. For the provinces, the
conflict has generally been one long, continuous experience
from the beginning of the 1990s, whereas Freetown witnessed
intermittent episodes of violence from the mid-1990s on. An
amendment to the Statute setting the temporal jurisdiction's
start-date from the beginning of the conflict would address the
criticisms of many in Sierra Leone who view the limitation as
arbitrary and unjust. It would keep faith with the tenets of inter-
national humanitarian law which do not apply from some retro-
spectively set date, arbitrarily fixed mid-way through the conflict,
but from the time the hostilities began. It would also perceptibly
foster a more cooperative and complementary relationship with
the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission ("TRC"),
which has a temporal jurisdiction dating from the beginning of
the conflict.
Another factor to be considered when examining the Spe-
cial Court's temporal jurisdiction is the amnesty granted under
the Lom6 Peace Agreement of July 7, 1999. The Secretary-Gen-
eral denied that this would act as any bar to the determination of
the start-date of the Special Court's jurisdiction: reasoning that
the "United Nations has consistently maintained the position
that amnesty cannot be granted in respect of international
crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity or other seri-
ous violations of international humanitarian law."' 00 In addi-
tion, he reiterated the disclaimer issued by his Special Represen-
tative for Sierra Leone at the time of the signing of the Lom6
Peace Agreement to the effect that "the amnesty provisions con-
tained in Article IX of the Agreement ('absolute and free par-
don') shall not apply to international crimes and other serious
violations of international humanitarian law." ''
However, the Statute acknowledges that amnesties will be
valid in respect of the included provisions of Sierra Leone law. 10 2
100. Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court in Sierra Leone,
supra note 54, paras. 22, 24.
101. Id. para. 23.
102. Draft Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 54, art. 10.
Article 10 provides:
An amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special
Court in respect of the crimes referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present
Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.
Id. The omission of Article 5, which inscribes the provisions of Sierra Leone law, indi-
cates that amnesties granted in respect of these crimes will be a bar to prosecution.
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This makes for a situation in which the Special Court may hear
violations of international humanitarian law committed since
November 30, 1996, but only hear violations of the Sierra Leone
provisions committed from the date of the signing of the Lom,
Peace Agreement-July 7, 1999. In effect, this creates a dual
start-date for the Special Court's temporal jurisdiction, which
could raise serious questions about the legitimacy of the court in
the eyes of the Sierra Leone public.
3. Personal Jurisdiction of the Special Court
The Statute for the Special Court provides that persons
prosecuted shall be those "persons who bear the greatest respon-
sibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law
and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Le-
one since 30 November 1996. "1o The terminology has been re-
tained in subsequent drafts of the Statute, despite the Secretary-
General's recommendation that the phrase "persons most re-
sponsible"-thought to widen the pool of potential defend-
ants-be employed.' °4
Persons who bear the greatest responsibility for violations
shall "includ[e] those leaders who, in committing such crimes,
have threatened the establishment of and implementation of the
peace process in Sierra Leone."105 The terminology is disturb-
ingly open-ended. Various agreements have been attempted
over the past five years-since the Kabbah-led government was
elected to power-and even more before that. However, the
U.N. only deployed a peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone sub-
sequent to the Lom6 Peace Agreement, allowing for the argu-
ment that the peace process to which the Statute refers is that
attempted after Lom6. Although unlikely, it is a possible and
disconcerting interpretation further limiting the scope of the
Special Court's focus and the restriction of its temporal jurisdic-
tion to the period after 1996.
Following from the Secretary-General's Report on the Estab-
103. Draft Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, supra note 54, art. 1(1)
(noting that this Feb. 2001 version of the Statute has not been released by the U.N. and
that only the Sierra Leonean government's draft is available).
104. Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court in Sierra Leone,
supra note 54, para. 29.
105. Draft Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, supra note 54, art. 1(1).
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lishment of a Special Court in Sierra Leone"°6 and the fact that
personal jurisdiction shall include and thereby not be limited to
leaders, it may be surmised that the determination of the ac-
cused will be made by reference to both their command author-
ity as well as the gravity and scale of the crimes. Appreciation
that the Prosecutor must consider these two factors might auger
for deference for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Yet,
the stipulation that the Special Court prosecute those "who bear
the greatest responsibility for serious violations" in contradistinc-
tion to the terminology employed in the ICTY and ICTR Stat-
utes107 -"the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious
violations"-makes the job of Prosecutor of the Special Court
that much more difficult and vulnerable to damaging criticism.
For example, it might be said that the Prosecutor is incapable of
determining the persons who bear the greatest responsibility
without undertaking an analysis of, at least, most of the viola-
tions committed during the conflict. However, an analysis of this
type is almost impossible, particularly given the limited resources
afforded the Special Court.
The aspect of the Special Court that has, perhaps, provoked
the most public debate is its position vis-a-vis those accused be-
low the age of eighteen at the time of the alleged commission of
the crimes. The position accurately reflected is that the Special
Court shall have no jurisdiction over persons under the age of
fifteen at the time of the alleged commission of the crime. 0 8
However, persons between the ages of fifteen and eighteen at
the time of alleged commission of the crime may be brought
before the Special Court, although the Prosecutor is directed to
resort to alternative truth and reconciliation mechanisms, where
appropriate.' 0 9 If convicted, juvenile offenders may not be sen-
tenced to imprisonment; instead the Special Court may order a
variety of correctional care. 1 o
The position represents a break with the Rome Statute for
the International Criminal Court which provides that the "Court
shall have no jurisdiction over any person who was under the age
106. Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court in Sierra Leone,
supra note 54, at para. 29.
107. See ICTY Statute, supra note 58, art. 1; ICTR Statute, supra note 59, art. 1.
108. Draft Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, supra note 54, art. 7(1).
109. Id. art. 15(5).
110. Id. art. 7(2).
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of 18 at the time of the alleged commission of a crime"' 1 and
has provoked protest from child protection agencies. 112 Un-
fairly, the Government of Sierra Leone has been said to have
insisted on the Special Court's power to prosecute juvenile of-
fenders. However, the provision, in fact, originated from the
U.N. Office of Legal Affairs. Upon receipt of the draft Statute
containing that provision from the Office of Legal Affairs, Sierra
Leone sought to change the jurisdiction to cover only persons
older than seventeen, the age at which persons take on full adult
criminal responsibility in Sierra Leone. At the urging of U.N.
officials both in New York and Freetown, the Government of Si-
erra Leone came to adopt the position initially advanced by the
U.N. and thereafter agreed to a revised Article 7 of the draft
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone."' The Statute
now allows for prosecution of those between the ages of fifteen
and eighteen at the time of the alleged commission of the crime,
but at least does not foresee a whole trial chamber specifically
designated to hear such trials as the U.N. initially proposed." 4
The outcry elicited in response to these provisions has de-
flected attention from arguably more serious deficiencies in the
Statute, given that the prescription of prosecuting "those who
bear the greatest responsibility" makes it extremely unlikely that
any juvenile offender will be prosecuted before the Special
Court.
4. No Grant of Chapter VII Powers
For all the difficulties created for the Special Court by what
it is given in the Statute, its greatest difficulties may stem from
what it has not been given. Most glaringly, it has not been given
111. Rome Statute, supra note 63, art. 26.
112. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court in Sierra
Leone, supra note 54, para. 35. "The international non-governmental organizations re-
sponsible for child-care and rehabilitation programmes, together with some of their
national counterparts, however, were unanimous in their objection to any kind ofjudi-
cial accountability for children below 18 years of age for fear that such a process would
place at risk the entire rehabilitation programme so painstakingly achieved." Id. para.
35.
113. This information is known to No Peace WithoutJustice because of its position
assisting the Sierra Leone Mission to the U.N. in New York and the Government of
Sierra Leone in Freetown.
114. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court in Sierra
Leone, supra note 54, art. 7(3) (b) (noting that this section includes an initial version of
the Draft Statute).
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Security Council Chapter VII powers. Although the Special
Court is to have concurrent jurisdiction with and primacy over
Sierra Leone courts, and thus appears to be endowed with pow-
ers similar to those enjoyed by the ICTR and ICTY, its primacy is
limited to the national courts of Sierra Leone and does not ex-
tend to courts of third-party States. This limitation results from
the absence of Chapter VII powers afforded the Special Court.
In contrast, the ad-hoc tribunals enjoy primacy and concurrent
jurisdiction in respect of all national courts. 1 5 Their establish-
ment by Security Council Chapter VII Resolution secures this
pre-eminent position as all States are obliged to comply with Se-
curity Council decisions adopted under Chapter VII. 116 The
Special Court lacks the power to request the surrender of an ac-
cused from any other State and to induce its compliance because
it has not similarly been vested with Chapter VII powers.
In his report, the Secretary-General himself draws attention
to the significant omission that will result should the Special
Court not be granted these powers." 7 He suggests that the Se-
curity Council "may wish to consider endowing it with Chapter
VII powers for the specific purpose of requesting the surrender
of an accused from outside the jurisdiction of the Court." '118
At the time of writing, the Security Council has not ac-
cepted this recommendation. One reason for its unwillingness
to heed the Secretary-General's suggestion that it endow the
Special Court with Chapter VII powers might be that this would
strengthen legal arguments that the Special Court is an organ of
the U.N., afforded Security Council powers, and so entitled to an
115. See ICTY Statute, supra note 58, art. 9; see also ICTR Statute, supra note 59, art.
8.
116. See U.N. CHARTER chap. VII, art. 48. Article 48 constitutes an affirmation in
the context of Chapter VII Security Council powers with respect to threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression and of Member States' obligations to
accept and effect binding decisions by the Security Council. Article 48 provides that:
"the action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security shall be taken by all Members of the United
Nations, or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine." Id. Article 103
states that "in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other inter-
national agreement, their obligation under the present Charter shall prevail." Id. chap.
XVI, art. 103.
117. Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
supra note 54, para. 10.
118. Id.
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assessed share of the U.N.'s ordinary budget.11 9
Yet, without the power to induce the surrender of those
"bearing the greatest responsibility for serious violations" the
Special Court must be considered a particularly deficient re-
sponse to the conflict that has swept through the country. Cen-
tral to this conflict has been the part played by regional actors.
Liberia and Burkina Faso have both lent considerable support to
the RUF, providing bases from which to launch attacks, as well as
providing ammunition, training, and money. Perpetrators might
seek refuge within these territories, safe from the reach of the
Special Court. Guinea, the site of recent attacks may also be
used for this purpose.
The attacks across Guinea's borders evidence another signif-
icant weakness of the Special Court's proposed method of estab-
lishment. The Special Court's territorial jurisdiction only en-
compasses the territory of Sierra Leone and so ignores the real-
ity of modern-day conflicts that are not neatly contained within
the territorial confines of one particular State, but spill over na-
tional borders and generate more conflict. A comprehensive re-
sponse to the war in Sierra Leone would entail the construction
of a judicial mechanism afforded reach over all parts of the con-
flict-a power not granted the Special Court but which easily
could have been given. In fact, the Security Council has at-
tempted to accommodate the realities of these types of conflicts
in the past and its omission in the case of Sierra Leone is made
all the more objectionable by the fact that it appreciated this
particular feature of the genocide in Rwanda and accordingly
vested the Tribunal with an extended territorial jurisdiction. Ar-
ticle 1 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda
provides that:
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power
to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of in-
ternational humanitarian law committed in the territory of
Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations
committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1
January 1994 and 31 December 1994, in accordance with the
119. See Thalif Deen, Sierra Leone Tribunal May Run into Funding Problems, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Jan. 4, 2001 (commenting on the Security Council's rejection of the
recommendation by the U.N. Secretary-General that the Special Court be financed
through mandatory fees levied on all 189 Member states).
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provisions of the present Statute.' 20
The precedent of this provision makes the inadequacy of the
powers afforded the Special Court all the more apparent.
5. Funding the Special Court
As a treaty-based organ, the Special Court is not anchored
within the existing U.N. administrative system and will not re-
ceive an assessed share of the budget as do the ICTY and ICTR.
Instead, the Security Council has been adamant from the outset
that the Special Court will be financed through voluntary contri-
butions. 12' The U.N. Secretary-General questioned this arrange-
ment in his report, arguing that:
While the Special Court differs from the two Tribunals in its
nature and legal status, the similarity in the kind of crimes
committed, the temporal, territorial and personal scope ofju-
risdiction, the number of accused, the organizational struc-
ture of the Court and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
suggest a similar scope and duration of operation and a simi-
lar need for a viable and sustainable financial mechanism. 122
Voluntary contributions proposed for the Special Court can-
not ensure the continuous and secure sources of funding
needed to appointjudges, the prosecution, registry and adminis-
trative staff and purchase the necessary equipment. For this rea-
son, the Secretary-General argues that the risks associated with
voluntary contributions are great "in terms of both moral re-
sponsibility and loss of credibility of the Organization, and its
exposure to legal liability."' 23 He emphatically states that the
Special Court "based on voluntary contributions would be
neither viable nor sustainable."1 24 He proposes two alternatives,
including, financing through assessed contributions which
would entail transforming the treaty-based court into a "United
120. ICTR Statute, supra note 59, art. 1.
121. See S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 53 (requesting the Secretary-General to include
recommendations on the "amount of voluntary contributions, as appropriate, of funds,
equipment and services to the Special Court, including through the offer of expert
personnel that may be needed from States, intergovernmental organizations and non-
governmental organizations").
122. Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court in Sierra Leone,
supra note 54, para. 69.
123. Id. para. 70.
124. Id.
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Nations organ governed in its financial and administrative activi-
ties by the relevant United Nations financial and staff regulations
and rules,' 2 or reliance on the existing Sierra Leonean court
system where judges, prosecutors, investigators, and administra-
tive staff would be contributed by interested States.12 1
It is hard to imagine a note of warning issued more urgently
and ominously than a public declaration by the Secretary-Gen-
eral in respect of a U.N.-sponsored institution. Yet the Security
Council has refused to reconsider its choice of funding by means
of voluntary contribution. It was decided, as a compromise after
it became clear that assessed contributions were not an option,
that implementation of the Agreement will only commence once
contributions sufficient to finance the establishment of the
Court and its first twelve months of operations are in hand, and
the amount equal to the anticipated expenses for the following
twenty-four months has been pledged. 127
Even given this formulation, voluntary contributions remain
a precarious means of funding a judicial institution: they have
already resulted in a drastic reduction of the Special Court's
budget, which was inadequate to begin. The Secretary-General
provided an initial estimate of the start-up costs for the Special
Court of U.S.$22 million, based "on the United Nations scale of
salaries for a one-year period, the personnel requirements along
with the corresponding equipment and vehicles." 128 The revised
estimated total expenses for the Special Court were U.S.$114.6
million-based on a projected three year working cycle-with
U.S.$30 million allocated for the establishment and first year's
operations. These initial figures are difficult to reconcile with
the Secretary-General's observation that the similarity of the de-
mands on the ad-hoc tribunals to those placed on the Special
Court suggest similar expenses incurred: "the experience
gained in the operation of the two ad hoc International Tribu-
nals provides an indication of the scope, costs and long-term du-
125. Id. para. 71.
126. A variation on the latter type of proposal has been employed in Kosovo and
East Timor. Carlotta Gall, U.N. 's Chief in Kosovo Plans a Special Court: Foreign Judges in
Ethnic and War Cases, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 24, 2000.
127. Letter of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/40 (Jan.
12, 2001).
128. Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court in Sierra Leone,
supra note 54, para. 58.
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ration of the judicial activities of an international jurisdiction of
this kind." 1
29
For 2001 the ICTY was awarded a budget of U.S.
$108,487,700130 and the ICTR a budget of U.S.$93,974,8001 3 1
and neither of these two institutions are without financial diffi-
culty. 132 The Special Court's initial U.S.$22 million seems paltry
in comparison: already less than a quarter of that given the ad-
hoc tribunals. Yet the Special Court is not even to receive this
comparatively small amount. Informal consultations indicated
that the U.N. could not hope to secure anywhere near the
amount it had estimated from Member States. Therefore, on
June 14, 2001, a revised budget was presented to the Group of
Interested States, 13 3 putting the costs of the first three years of
operation at U.S.$57 million, with U.S.$16.8 million for the first
year.134 As ofJuly 6, 2001, the Secretariat received indications of
contributions for the Special Court's first year of operation at
U.S.$15 million-a shortfall of approximately U.S.$1.8 million-
and pledges for the following twenty-four months at approxi-
mately U.S.$20.4 million-a shortfall of approximately U.S.$19.6
million for the second and third years combined.1
3 5
Assuming that these funds are secured and implementation
of the Agreement commences, it is nonetheless difficult to imag-
129. Id. para. 69 (emphasis added).
130. Financing of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Re-
sponsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, G.A Res. 55/255, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/225 (2001).
131. Financing of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Per-
sons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humani-
tarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible
for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring
States between 1 January and 31 December 1994, G.A. Res. 55/266, U.N. GAOR, 55th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/226 (2001).
132. See Report on the Operation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/RAP000620e.htm; see also
Statement by the President of the ICTR to the U.N. General Assembly (2000), available
at http://www.ictr.org/.
133. The Group of Interested States is a self-selected group of U.N. Member States
who are taking an active interest in the establishment of the Special Court. They are
primarily those who have indicated their willingness to contribute funds for the Court.
134. Letter from the Secretariat, S/2001/693 (July 12, 2001), available at http://
www.un.org/Docs/sc/letters/2001/693e.pdf (referring to an amended budget and a
June 14, 2001 letter from the Secretariat to Member States regarding revised budget
estimates). These numbers include contributions received up until July 6, 2001.
135. Id.
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ine how the Special Court will evolve as a viable, effective judicial
institution with so diminished a budget. This realization is made
all the more obvious when one considers that the Special Court
will have to shoulder not only the costs carried by the ad-hoc
tribunals on their much larger budgets, but also the costs of a
separate Appeals Chamber composed of five judges, while the ad
hoc tribunals share an Appeals Tribunal.
B. The Special Court Placed in Context
The previous assessments examined possible difficulties for
the Special Court that largely inhere in the institutional design
of the Special Court itself. The following section looks at com-
plicated aspects of the Special Court that will flow from its opera-
tion in the particular context of Sierra Leone.
1. The Special Court and the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission
Article XXVI of the Lom6 Accord provides for the establish-
ment of a TRC to "address impunity, break the cycle of violence,
provide a forum for both the victims and the perpetrators of
human rights violations to tell their story, get a clear picture of
the past to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation."" 6 The
Commission is to investigate human rights violations committed
since the beginning of the Sierra Leonean conflict in 1991. Al-
though the Commission has not yet begun its operations due to
bureaucratic delays in Geneva and elsewhere, the Sierra Le-
onean government has already enacted legislation for its estab-
lishment.13 7
It is unclear at present how the Special Court and TRC will
function together; whether they will overlap or follow on from
each other. The Report of the Secretary-General acknowledges
that at some future point "relationship and cooperation arrange-
136. Lom6 Accord, supra note 29.
137. See The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, available at http://
www.sierra-leone.org/trc.html (2001) [hereinafter TRCI. The TRC is to be composed
of seven commissioners, four of whom will be citizens of Sierra Leone. The remaining
three will be foreigners. All will be appointed by the President of Sierra Leone. It is to
be operational for a period of one year although it will have an additional three-month
preparatory period and may be extended for six-month periods after the initial 12
months have passed. It will investigate human rights violations from the outbreak of
the conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lom6 Accord. Id.
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ments would be required between the Prosecutor and the Na-
tional Truth and Reconciliation Commission, including the use
of the Commission as an alternative to prosecution, and the
prosecution of juveniles in particular." 13 8 The current draft of
the Statute requires that, in the prosecution of juveniles, the
Prosecutor, where appropriate, resorts to alternative truth and
reconciliation mechanisms, to the extent of their availability.
Given that prescription and the fact that the Sierra Leone TRC
legislation predates both the Secretary-General's Report and the
Security Council Resolution on the Special Court, it is questiona-
ble why the relationship between the two institutions was not ad-
dressed at the time of the institutional design of the Special
Court. While the Security Council noted the "steps taken by the
Government of Sierra Leone in creating a national truth and
reconciliation process, as required by Article XXVI of the Lom6
Peace Agreement (S/1999/777) to contribute to the promotion
of the rule of law," it failed to request that the Secretary-General
take this into account in the creation of the Special Court.
This omission is not, perhaps, as shortsighted as it may first
appear. The failure to include an explicit reference to the TRC
either in the Statute or the Agreement for the Special Court im-
plicitly recognizes and underscores the independent nature of
both institutions. Thus the formulation of cooperative arrange-
ments has, it could be argued, properly been left to the institu-
tions that will be required to implement those arrangements and
that will have the necessary specific expertise to resolve poten-
tially thorny details.
Nonetheless, confusion around these two institutions has al-
lowed the perception to be created in Sierra Leone that a choice
must or might be made between one or the other rather than
understanding each as complementary. The dynamics are com-
plicated and ensuring some form of transitional justice in Sierra
Leone will involve a careful balancing of these institutions, not
only by local actors but also by the international community. At
present and over the course of the next few months, disarma-
ment and demobilization will take center-stage. Successful con-
clusion of this process may politically involve downplaying the
Special Court or TRC at certain points.
138. Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court in Sierra Leone,
supra note 54, para. 8.
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On the other hand, it is important that both the Special
Court and TRC be understood as forming part of a larger whole.
This bigger picture is supplied by the global context and by ap-
preciating accountability as fundamental to lasting peace in Si-
erra Leone. Only by understanding the two institutions as com-
plementary will the Sierra Leone process represent a develop-
ment for international accountability mechanisms and not a
regression. For example, the Sierra Leone TRC, viewed in isola-
tion, is a step back from the South African TRC process, which
has not escaped challenge for awarding amnesties to persons re-
sponsible for crimes against humanity.13 In South Africa, how-
ever, there was incentive for perpetrators to come forward and
disclose their crimes in order to receive amnesty. Otherwise,
they faced the prospect of prosecution. It has been said simplis-
tically, but somewhat accurately, that South Africans exchanged
prosecutions for truth. This cannot be said even simplistically
about the TRC process in Sierra Leone. To the extent that am-
nesty was given, it was given at Lom6, thereby removing a partic-
ularly strong incentive for the appearance of perpetrators before
the TRC.
The transitional justice process in Sierra Leone need not be
understood as deficient if greater emphasis is placed on the way
in which the two institutions might operate together: the TRC
allowing for the recounting of personal experience and the con-
struction of historical narrative which is essential when one con-
siders that Sierra Leone's conflict has too often, too simply, been
dismissed as anarchic. This process of truth-telling and narrative
construction is, however, to be overlain by Special Court prose-
cutions which (although in flawed fashion, given the limited
numbers it is to prosecute) signals that those responsible for
crimes against humanity and war crimes will not receive immu-
nity.
As yet the U.N. has not attempted to present the two institu-
tions as complementary, 40 allowing for the expression of con-
cerns that information given to the TRC will be used to secure
139. See Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) and Another v. President of the
RSA and Others 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (CC) (noting that the families of slain political
activists, Steve Biko and Griffiths Mxenge challenged the TRC legislation on the basis
that an award of amnesty for crimes against humanity violated South Africa's interna-
tional law obligations).
140. To the extent it has undertaken any educational campaigns, the U.N. has
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convictions before the Special Court and so inspiring fears of
intimidation and more violence.
2. Amnesty Provisions in the Lom6 Accord
The Secretary-General's Special Representative for Sierra
Leone appended his signature to the Lom6 Peace Agreement
with the disclaimer that "the amnesty provision contained in arti-
cle IX of the Agreement ('absolute and free pardon') shall not
apply to international crimes and other serious violations of in-
ternational humanitarian law.""14 Indeed, the Special Court is
premised on this idea, namely that people who are suspected of
having committed crimes under international law must be held
accountable for their actions, amnesty or no amnesty. This is
reflected in article 10 of the Statute itself, which provides that
"[a] n amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdic-
tion of the Special Court in respect of [crimes under interna-
tional law] shall not be a bar to prosecution. "142
The representative of the government of Sierra Leone, how-
ever, made no disclaimer in respect of the amnesty provisions
upon signing the Lom6 Peace Agreement. In fact, the Agree-
ment was premised on the Government's offer of absolute and
free pardon to all combatants and collaborators in exchange for
the RUF's undertaking to cease hostilities.'43 Under Sierra Le-
sought to increase awareness about the TRC. Tenth Report of the Secretaqy-General on the
U.N. Mission to Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2001/627, para. 59.
141. Lom6 Accord, supra note 29, para. 23.
142. Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,
supra note 54, para. 24; see also The Draft Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone,
supra note 54, art. 10.
143. Lom(! Accord, supra note 29, art. IX. The full text of Article IX reads as fol-
lows:
(1) In order to bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone, the Government of Sierra
Leone shall take appropriate legal steps to grant Corporal Foday Sankoh
absolute and free pardon.
(2) After the signing of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra
Leone shall grant absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combat-
ants and collaborators in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of
their objectives, up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement.
(3) To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconcilia-
tion, the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official orjudi-
cial action is taken against any member of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA
or CDF in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives
as members of those organizations, since March 1991 up to the time of
the signing of the present Agreement. In addition, legislative and other
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one law, a pardon offers constitutional protection against prose-
cution, which can only be derogated from to the extent neces-
sary for dealing with situations of public emergency.144 In addi-
tion to the granting of absolute and free pardon, the
Government agreed that no judicial or official action would be
taken against any of the combatants in respect of anything done
by them in furtherance of their objectives from March 1991 to
July 1999. Had these terms not been included, or had only par-
tial immunity been offered, the Lom6 talks would have been
doomed to failure.
Despite these assurances, the Government not only agreed
to the inclusion of article 10 in the Statute of the Special Court,
it actively sought means by which criminal prosecutions could be
brought against the very people it purported to pardon. This
apparently contradictory behavior allows for a number of legal
challenges. Those opposed to the amnesty may challenge the
constitutionality of article IX of Lom6, on the basis that no con-
stitutional power exists by which to grant any individual immu-
nity before a criminal trial has been concluded. The Constitu-
tion vests the prerogative of mercy in the President, who accord-
ingly has the power "to grant any person convicted of any
offence against the laws of Sierra Leone a pardon, either free or
subject to lawful conditions."' 45 It does not purport to endow
the President or anyone else with the ability either to grant a
pardon before conviction or to guarantee anyone that criminal
prosecutions will not be brought against them. Consequently, it
might be argued that article IX of Lom6 and any subsequent
implementing legislation is unconstitutional and thus invalid, at
least to the extent of its inconsistency with the Constitution.
Those seeking to safeguard the amnesty, on the other hand,
measures necessary to guarantee immunity to former combatants, exiles
and other persons currently outside the country for reasons related to
armed conflict shall be adopted using the full exercise of their civil and
political rights, with a view to their reintegration within a framework of
legality.
Id.
144. SIERRA LEONE CONST., §§ 23(9)-(10), available at http://www.sierra-le-
one.org/constitution.html. While a state of emergency has existed in Sierra Leone
since 1999, it is unclear whether any measure allowing the prosecution of "pardoned"
individuals would be reasonably justifiable for the purposes of dealing with that emer-
gency.
145. Id. § 63(1)(a).
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may argue that the Sierra Leone Government has acted contrary
to its obligations under Lom6. They might do so by reasoning
that the very act of negotiating and concluding an agreement to
prosecute people for atrocities committed during the conflict, in
essence the Agreement on the Special Court, can be character-
ized as an "official action," contrary to article IX(3) of Lome
which prescribes any "official or judicial action" on the part of
the Government against any of the combatants. 146
The Government has not endorsed the unconstitutionality
argument. It need not do so in order to ensure that those ac-
cused of atrocities are brought to justice. Instead, it might main-
tain that the Lom6 Peace Agreement was first breached by the
RUF, thereby rendering the Agreement void and releasing the
Government from its obligations. Further, it might argue that
the amnesty granted "in respect of anything done by them in
pursuit of their objectives" '147 was intended only to comport with
the international humanitarian principle that combatants in civil
wars should not be penalized simply for having taken part in hos-
tilities148 and that it was never intended to cover violations of
international humanitarian law.' 49 An additional support is pro-
vided by the principle of aut dedere autjudicare, namely that every
State is under a legal, non-derogable obligation to either prose-
cute or extradite people suspected of having committed these
types of crimes. This pre-existing obligation would render Arti-
cle IX of the Lom6 Peace Agreement and any subsequent imple-
menting legislation void, as the Government had no capacity to
contract out of its international legal obligations.
All this might seem to have very little significance for the
U.N., since once the Agreement is signed the question of
whether Sierra Leone has breached its domestic law will not af-
fect the validity of that agreement. 50 However, the Special
Court represents a joint endeavor, therefore its success depends
146. See Lom6 Accord, supra note 29, art. IX.
147. See id.
148. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977,
art. 6(5), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442.
149. Indeed, the Presidential prerogative of mercy is limited to granting pardon
for offences committed against the laws of Sierra Leone, not to crimes under any other
jurisdiction.
150. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International
Organizations or Between International Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, art. 46. The Pro-
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upon the Government's ability to make good its obligations and
direct its enforcement power to the apprehension, detention,
and trial of the accused and the sentencing and punishment of
those convicted. Given this, the U.N. cannot ignore the situa-
tion. At the very least it must help the Government comprehen-
sively address this issue. If establishment of the Special Court
proceeds and this proves to be a stumbling block to its effective
operation, the U.N. will ultimately be held responsible and the
failure will throw into question the future practice of Tribunal-
creation.
IV. INNOVATIVE JUDICIAL MECHANISMS IN A COUNTRY OF
MORE PRESSING NEEDS
The establishment of an innovative, sophisticated judicial
mechanism in a country said to be the least developed in the
world raises a number of difficulties.15 ' The ten-year war is
largely a manifestation of the dire economic conditions faced by
people in the region. Addressing these conditions and ending
the war by investing funds in the disarmament process seem
more obvious priorities for the immediate future. This senti-
ment is often expressed in Sierra Leone: the media, for in-
stance, often argues that the money for the Special Court could
be better used for other objectives. But even if we ignore the
visions of internal law of a State and rules of an international organization regarding
competence to conclude treaties state that:
1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has
been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding com-
petence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation
was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental im-
portance.
2. An international organization may not invoke the fact that its consent to be
bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of the rules of the organi-
zation regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its con-
sent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of fundamen-
tal importance.
3. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State or any
international organization conducting itself in the matter in accordance
with the normal practice of States and, where appropriate, of international
organizations and in good faith.
Id.
151. "At the end of 2000, the net present value of the country's external debt was
equivalent to 707% of GDP, while external debt service due equaled 48% of exports
and about 70% of government revenues." Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, supra note 39, para. 54.
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argument that there can be no real ending of conflict without
addressing the cycle of impunity that exists in Sierra Leone, the
fact remains that the money is not available to be spent on other
goals. There is no general pool of money allocated to Sierra Le-
one that is depleted by committing funds to the Special Court.
The choice, therefore, is not between spending the money on
the Special Court or directing it to other objectives; it is between
having funds for the Special Court or not having funds at all.
Nonetheless, the economic conditions in Sierra Leone pose
real challenges to the successful operation of the Special Court.
While the Court will be based in Sierra Leone and is, therefore,
theoretically more accessible to the people there than the ad-hoc
tribunals are for the people of those regions respectively, lack of
infrastructure makes it unlikely that the Special Court will be
genuinely accessible. High rates of illiteracy compound the
problem. Justifications offered accountability mechanisms such
as the Special Court-that they deter would-be war criminals,
end the culture of impunity, offer the victims acknowledgement
of their suffering-all depend for their veracity of the workings
of these institutions being observed and understood. Where this
cannot be guaranteed, as in Sierra Leone, articulation of these
justifications leaves room for doubt.
It must also be appreciated that these difficulties-lack of
infrastructure, illiteracy, and the sheer number of people af-
fected-will hamper the actual workings of the Special Court,
particularly the work of the Prosecutor's Office, which will need
to build cases, solicit and collect evidence and testimonies.
However, the U.N. is attentive to the challenges posed for
the peace process by the overwhelming economic needs of Si-
erra Leoneans. Its attempts at instantiating post-conflict judicial
processes are only one part of a multi-faceted approach, involv-
ing military, economic, and political initiatives, by which peace is
put in place. It must balance these factors as best it can. And
yet, Sierra Leoneans and human rights advocates are right to de-
mand a meaningful, sustained form of transitional justice for Si-
erra Leone-one that serves as no handmaiden for any of the
other peace process initiatives. Accordingly, economic, military,
and political initiatives must not be allowed to directly undercut
the foundation for the Special Court.
Sadly this situation occurs when the Secretary-General urges
CURRENT APATHY FOR COMING ANARCHY
assistance for the RUF "to transform itself into a genuine politi-
cal party that can participate in the coming elections" and ap-
peals to "countries in the West African sub-region, as well as do-
nor countries, to extend technical and other appropriate assis-
tance to the RUF in this regard." The appeal is triggered by his
concern that demobilized combatants "not directly benefiting
from disarmament could resort to activities that might under-
mine not only the peace process in Sierra Leone but also the
stability of the subregion."' 15 2
Criminal trials in the wake of mass atrocity are valuable, not
least because they individualize guilt and militate against demon-
ization of whole groups, however they are also important be-
cause they safeguard against political rehabilitation. Akhavan
writes specifically in relation to Rwanda that criminal indict-
ments and prosecutions "thwarted any political rehabilitation
and military reorganization of Hutu extremism.""15 Yet this is
exactly what the Secretary-General requests in respect of the
RUF. Admittedly the Special Court is not intended to target the
RUF, but if predictions can be made, it is that many of those
deemed to "bear the greatest responsibility" for atrocities com-
mitted during the conflict will be drawn from the upper eche-
lons of the RUF hierarchy. They are, as yet, unindicted and thus
inseparable from the RUF, making it difficult to treat the RUF as
legitimate without the risk of shoring up their leadership and
advancing their personal ambitions (including evasion of the
Special Court). The Secretary-General's appeal now, at a time
when the U.N. purports to seek the establishment of the Special
Court, risks discrediting the U.N., by appearing malleable, and
undercutting support for the Special Court, by requiring that
those who might be prosecuted be treated as legitimate.
These circumstances-individually, but more powerfully in
combination-suggest that the climate in Sierra Leone is not
hospitable to the workings of the Special Court. The U.N.'s
readiness to establish this experimental judicial process without
consideration for the legal and political landscape in which it
will operate, its failure to attempt to make that landscape more
152. Eleventh Report of the Secretaiy-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Le-
one, supra note 39, para. 59. It is interesting to note that the same report records that a
far greater number of CDF soldiers have been disarmed and demobilized than RUF
soldiers. Yet no special measures are urged for them lest they threaten peace.
153. Akhavan, supra note 5, at 23.
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amenable and, most seriously, its active contribution to an un-
supportive environment, must trigger the gravest concern.
CONCLUSION
In many respects the Special Court appears to represent
"boutique justice:" an overrated, overly expensive means of do-
ing what courts in Sierra Leone are quite capable of doing them-
selves, perhaps not better but certainly faster. Yet, in one impor-
tant respect the Special Court offers an advantage the domestic
courts cannot: as a U.N.-sponsored institution it offers more le-
gitimacy than the Government ever could acting alone-contrib-
uting to a more stable, enduring peace. Even those who com-
plain of the cost of the Court can appreciate and subscribe to
this argument.
The publicity accorded negotiations between the Govern-
ment of Sierra Leone and the U.N. on the Special Court and the
many statements made in Sierra Leone concerning the need for
this institution have raised a legitimate expectation that the
Court will be established and it will do its work well. However,
the flaws in the substantive mandate and institutional design of
the Court throw into question the international community's ca-
pacity to deliver on its promises and its commitment to address-
ing the conflict in Sierra Leone.
There is no more pressing reason to ensure that the Special
Court does, indeed, do its work well than the people of Sierra
Leone themselves. Their suffering during ten years of brutal war
has for too long gone neglected. Yet there is another important
reason: post-conflictjudicial mechanisms are relatively new phe-
nomena. They constitute an essential, if still experimental, part
of an increasingly elaborate and sophisticated toolbox with
which the international community addresses conflict. Should
one of these individual institutions fail at this formative stage, as
the Special Court may do spectacularly, all post-conflict judicial
mechanisms may come to be viewed as irrelevant. Robert
Kaplan's argument that institutionalizing war crimes tribunals
will not reduce the commission of these types of crimes will al-
ways be easy to answer. That tribunals of Sierra Leone's type-
under-funded, ill-equipped, and disorganized from the time of
its inception-constitute the most artificial, apathetic attempts
to address conflict will always be the more difficult argument to
refute.
